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On August 6-8, 2007, Prof. Neil Buchanan posted in
Michael Dorf’s blog (http://michaeldorf.org/; for the
blog entry regarding the death tax, see http://
michaeldorf.org/2007/08/dishonest-tax-rhetoric-part-3-
of-3.html) a three-part series on what he deemed to be
examples of political use of terminology to describe tax
issues in a manner that is likely to mislead the public.
Prof. Buchanan described this practice as ‘‘dishonest tax
rhetoric.’’ He awarded first, second, and third prizes for
the most egregious examples of dishonest rhetoric. I,
however, found no objection to the usages he considered
to be the two worst examples. Let us consider his first
and second prizes.
His first prize went to the use of the term ‘‘death tax’’
when referring to an estate tax. Prof. Buchanan points out
that other taxes (such as income and property taxes) are
not described by reference to the date on which they
become payable. But the significance of the death of a
decedent to the estate tax is quite different from the date
of payment of an income or property tax. An income tax
is imposed on the earning of income; but to enforce the
tax, there has to be a date for its determination and
collection. The payment date is no more than an admin-
istrative stage for collection. However, a death tax is not
merely payable or determined on the date of death; it is
the death itself that is the trigger. The decedent’s death is
not merely an administrative step toward collection. To
the contrary, it is a crucial element of the creation of the
tax liability. No death, no tax. An income tax liability
accrues (in a general sense) before its collection date, but
an estate tax liability does not accrue before the de-
cedent’s death.
Moreover, the term ‘‘death tax’’ has been used by
estate lawyers for many years — long before the question
of the retention of a federal estate tax became an issue.
Indeed, the code itself uses the term ‘‘death tax’’ and has
employed that term for more than 53 years. Section 2011
is titled ‘‘Credit for State Death Taxes.’’ Section 2014 is
titled ‘‘Credit for Foreign Death Taxes.’’ Section 2015 is
titled ‘‘Credit for Death Taxes on Remainders.’’ Those
three sections were adopted in 1953 as part of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.
Prof. Buchanan treats the term ‘‘death tax’’ as an
inappropriate synonym for an estate tax. But that is not
correct. The term ‘‘death tax’’ is broader than an estate
tax. An estate tax is merely one type of death tax. The
term ‘‘death tax’’ includes estate taxes, inheritance taxes,
legacy taxes, and succession taxes. An inheritance tax is
different from an estate tax.
The second prize (or silver medal) that Prof. Buchanan
awarded was for the national sales tax that has been
proposed as a substitute for the income tax. Prof. Bucha-
nan maintains that the proponents of that tax have
calculated the rate of tax in a manner that is designed to
mislead the public into thinking that the rate is lower
than it actually is. He has other objections to the substi-
tution of a sales tax, but he awarded the prize for the
manner in which the rate of tax was determined by the
proponents.
The proponents of the tax claim that it could be set at
a 23 percent rate to provide the same revenue that the
income tax provides. Prof. Buchanan contends that the
average member of the public is likely to be misled by
that statement. He offers the following example.
X pays $100 to purchase an item and then pays $30 in
tax. X has paid a total of $130 to purchase the item, of
which $30 is the tax. The proponents of the tax describe
the rate of tax as 23 percent because $30 is 23 percent of
the $130 total outlay. In other words, the proponents
compute the rate of tax on a tax-inclusive basis. Prof.
Buchanan contends that that is misleading. If the tax rate
were described on a tax-exclusive basis, the rate would
be 30 percent — the $30 tax is 30 percent of the $100 paid
for the item exclusive of the tax. Because sales taxes
currently are, and always have been, described on a
tax-exclusive basis, Prof. Buchanan argues that the public
will construe the 23 percent rate as meaning that they
would pay a tax of $23 on a $100 purchase of an item.
There is a reasonable basis for describing the tax on
either a tax-inclusive or a tax-exclusive basis. Income tax
rates are provided on a tax-inclusive basis. One reason
for describing the income tax in that manner is that the
tax is easier to calculate that way. Similarly, the sales tax
is easier to calculate if the rate is described in a tax-
exclusive manner, and that is a likely reason that that
method is employed for the sales tax. Prof. Buchanan
himself essentially concedes that the use of the 23 percent
rate is reasonable, stating that it ‘‘has at least some basis
in reality.’’ However, he believes that the 23 percent rate
was chosen because it is likely to confuse the public. He
states, ‘‘It is the difference between lying and intent to
deceive.’’
But would stating that the rate of tax is 30 percent not
also mislead the public? A major purpose of stating the
rate of tax is to give the public a means of comparing the
proposed sales tax with the income tax that it would
replace. But, as noted above, the income tax rates are
determined on a tax-inclusive basis. If one earns $130 and
pays an income tax of $30 to the government, the tax rate
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is described as a 23 percent rate, not as a 30 percent rate.
If the public is to compare the cost of a sales tax to the
cost of an income tax that it would replace, it needs to
have rates determined in a comparable manner. If a
taxpayer earns $130, pays $30 in income taxes, and
spends the remaining $100 to purchase an item, his tax
rate is referred to as 23 percent. If the income tax were
replaced by a sales tax, and if the taxpayer purchased the
same item for $100 and paid $30 in sales tax, his tax rate
should be considered the same as it was under the
income tax regime. If you tell the taxpayer that if a sales
tax is adopted, his tax rate will change from 23 percent to
30 percent, you would mislead him into thinking that his
tax liability would be greater under the sales tax.
The fact is that either method of determining the tax
rate has the potential to mislead when the listener does
not understand the difference in methods of determina-
tion. The method chosen by the proponents of the tax
actually seems better to me in that it provides a more
accurate figure for comparison. If a taxpayer knows that
he is paying income tax at an average rate of 25 percent,
the 23 percent rate gives him a better figure for compari-
son than does the 30 percent rate that a tax-exclusive
determination would provide. I could not criticize any-
one for using either the 23 percent or 30 percent rate,
because each has its merits and its disadvantages. I
certainly cannot see how the use of either rate could
qualify for an award for dishonesty.
The choice of the 23 percent rate likely was motivated,
at least partly, by advocacy considerations. The use of
language for advocacy purposes is a common occurrence
and is by no means used exclusively by politicians. For
example, lawyers — and even law professors — have
been known to indulge in that practice. The preference
for using a 30 percent rate could be seen as driven by
political or advocacy considerations to make unfavorable
the comparison of the sales tax to the income tax.
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